Islamic schools in three western countries: policy and procedure more

Comparative Education Vol. 41, No. 4, November 2005, pp. 411–432 Islamic schools in three western countries: policy and procedure Michael S. Merrya* and Geert Driessenb aUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison, USA; bRadboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands Department Education MichaelMerry Educational Policy StudiesUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonUSmsmerry@wisc.edu 0 400000November 2005 41 2005 & Francis Original Article 0305-0068 Francis Comparativeof 10.1080/03050060500300931 CCED130076.sgm Ltd Taylor and (print)/1360-0486 (online) In this article, the authors compare Islamic schools in three countries: the United States, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In each country, the authors take care to situate Islamic schools within the broader context of educational policy and practice. In particular, the authors examine the mechanisms for funding, choice and control, noting that for reasons specific to each context monitoring either by the state or accrediting agencies poses both challenges and opportunities for Islamic schools. Introduction In this paper, we will compare the place of Islamic schools in three countries: the United States, the Netherlands and Belgium. The reasons for the choice of these countries have to do with the interesting differences that emerge in such a comparison. Culturally, there is much to compare between the Netherlands and Belgium owing to their geographical contiguity and political affinities. Both countries are robust welfare states. Catholicism enjoys a strong influence in the Netherlands and Belgium, though it encompasses nearly all social institutions in Belgium, while the Calvinist tradition has historically been dominant in the Netherlands. The Dutch language, as it concerns the Netherlands and the northern half of Belgium (Flanders), enhances the sameness, too. One also finds examples of non-denominational and denominational schools in both countries, with a majority of children attending Catholic schools in Belgium, and either Protestant or Catholic schools in the Netherlands. The United States offers an example of a highly industrialized western democracy that endeavours to maintain the separation of church and state. Yet despite its resolute and well-intentioned claims, even a cursory glance at the political rhetoric of *Corresponding author. 810 Chapin Street, Beloit, Wisconsin 53511, USA. Email: merrym@beloit.edu ISSN 0305-0068 (print)/ISSN 1360-0486 (online)/05/040411–22 © 2005 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/03050060500300931 412 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen American politicians, the practices in courtrooms across the country, and the privileging of Christian symbols and holidays in American public life reveals that the separation of church and state in the United States is far from clear. While church and state battles have played out in public schools for various reasons, Islamic schools have inconspicuously grown in number and influence, mostly able to enjoy the freedom accorded to various religious groups. With this freedom comes no direct federal aid and only minimal accountability to the state. This picture is diametrically opposite to both the Netherlands and Belgium. While religious education is widely available in both countries, in the Netherlands classes in religion and life philosophy are required only in primary school, while in Belgium either religious instruction in any recognized religion (including Islam) or nonconfessional ethics classes is compulsory for both primary and secondary levels. The secularization process in the urban areas since the 1960s in both countries has been profound, especially in certain Catholic provinces in the Netherlands and Frenchspeaking Belgium. In the United States, in contrast, despite the reticence of public schools and institutions on themes germane to religion, faith continues to be a powerful catalyst in public decision-making and political campaigns. The Dutch situation in particular is a unique test case for the full funding of all denominational schools, and not only those that have been historically privileged. This has to do with Dutch constitutional guarantees that have been in place for more than eighty-five years. The Belgian situation is infinitely more complex; this is partly the reason why we have chosen to include it in this study. Aside from its various language communities and regional governments, Belgium is unique in all of Europe for its large-scale provision of Islamic instruction in state schools. Many feel that this largely explains why there have been so few proposals for more Islamic schools (Rath et al., 1991; Wagtendonk, 1991). This study’s contribution lies mainly in its comparative analysis of the mechanisms for funding, choice and control of Islamic schools between three highly industrialized western countries. While a great deal of discussion has been taken up in recent years concerning the state funding and monitoring of religious schools (Judge, 2001; Underkuffler, 2001; de Jong & Snik, 2002), little has been done to compare the policies and procedural norms of Islamic schools between countries with sizable Muslim populations. We must be clear at the outset that at no point in the following discussion can it be assumed that the ‘west’ equals ‘secular’ or that Islam equals ‘unified front’. For starters, secularism among the Muslim community itself is widespread in western countries, though Islamic identity is rarely questioned. Even non-practising Muslims who smoke, drink alcohol, eat forbidden food, etc., seldom completely renounce their Muslim identities. Also, an Islamic identity for many Muslims translates as little more than a nationalist feeling; this is especially the case with the majority of TurkishEuropeans, for whom a public expression of Islam is discouraged. Finally, Islam, despite idealized portraits of a unified religion and a corresponding absence of internal conflict by her apologists, is in fact fraught with internal tensions (Kazmi, 2003; Saadallah, 2004). Indeed, there is much dispute over the manner in which Muslims Islamic schools in three western countries 413 are to express themselves qua Muslims in a western context. Similarly, by situating Islamic schools in a western context, it cannot be assumed that Islamic schools are (a) undifferentiated or (b) occupy a ‘secular’ space. First, Islamic schools are quite different one from the other; though a broad pattern of resemblance can be expected, schools operate according to different pedagogical goals and with varying levels of administrative efficiency. Second, no matter how much institutional Christianity has been in decline over the past decades, the privileges for nominal Christian membership are still firmly established throughout Europe and North America. Belgium Muslims in Belgium The two largest groups of immigrants in Belgium are Turkish and Moroccan Muslims. Collectively Muslims are estimated to comprise close to 4% (350,000) of the total Belgian population, but nearer to 10% of the population in the region of Brussels-Capital with some 80,000 Turks and 140,000 Moroccans. Notwithstanding their acute differences, Moroccan and Turkish Muslims in Belgium show a similar, relatively young generational structure; they also typically are placed in the lowest track of education and are employed in semi-skilled or unskilled labour. In this way, the Muslim community as instantiated by these two ethnic groups impressively matches that of low educated Belgians living in the same relatively disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002; Merry, 2005). While power relations are undeniably present, some strive to be ‘integrated’ on the terms set by migrant policy (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1994; Blommaert & Martiniello, 1996), while others insist on remaining distinct, preferring to be recognized as minorities. This is less and less the case in the last fifteen years, as waves of second and third generation Muslims have naturalized as Belgian citizens. Several successive occurrences gave rise to a strong reaction to Islam on Belgian soil. These include the Islamic revolution in Iran, the American bombing of Tripoli, the Rushdie Affair, and the first Gulf War. Muslims have staged several protests (dubbed ‘riots’ by the media) in Brussels and Antwerp as well, and clashes with police have sometimes been violent. In addition, the belief that foreign Islamic governments may very well be plotting to infiltrate Belgian schools through Muslim teachers led to a growing sense of unease concerning the presence of Muslims. These items, coupled with the concurrent rise of unemployment in the late 1980s, made Muslim immigrants an easy scapegoat and the mayors of several Brussels-Capital municipalities expressed grave concern over the provision of Islamic instruction in schools. Coinciding with these incidents was the rise of anti-immigrant (read, anti-Muslim) politics, particularly in Flanders. Worthy of mention here is the Vlaams Blok party. Owing to a strong cultural preservationist movement, the Blok has enjoyed unprecedented success for the past fifteen years. Much of its message has focused on the incompatibility of Islamic culture with western cultures and values. At times its leaders have openly sought the deportation of Muslims to their countries of origin. It is largely in 414 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen reaction to the anti-Muslim rhetoric of groups like the Blok that Muslims have begun to organize themselves. The efforts, however, have not always been successful. In late 2004, the high court in Belgium ruled that the Blok would not be allowed to continue under its current name or with its previous agenda. It has since reorganized and operates under the name, Vlaams Belang [Flemish Interest]. Belgian Islamic school(s) Belgium is unique in the western world because of its wide-scale provision of Islamic education in public schools on demand (once a minimal threshold is reached). Such instruction has been provided since the 1975–1976 school year, when salaried posts for Muslim teachers became legalized and available. Since that time, the law has allowed for the teaching of Islam in public schools on the same basis as other religions; more than 700 Muslim teachers provide Islamic instruction and are employed in the Belgian education system (Merry, 2005). For many years, these teachers were contracted out by the embassies of the respective governments. Since 1986 all instructors of Islamic education in Belgium are required to have either Belgian nationality or a minimum of five years residency, demonstrate the ability to give instruction in either Dutch or French, and receive a diploma recognized by the Ministry of National Education (Leman & Renaerts, 1996). The Muslim Council, inaugurated in December 1998, alone may determine the content of the religious instruction, though generally the subjects taught include the ¯ Qur’an (with recitation), the fiqh (Islamic law and jurisprudence), the sira (life of the Prophet and the period of the first four Caliphs), and Islamic dogma. Estimates suggest that roughly 40% of Muslim children attend Islamic instruction in state schools, while the majority attends the non-confessional ethics classes (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995). Many Muslim parents feel that these classes are lacking in substantive content, but given the relatively high degree of secularization among (particularly Moroccan) Muslim children, this concern seldom amounts to anything. To date, neither regional government has required that specific content be covered, nor has any systematic inspection of the lessons transpired. One can trace many reasons why Muslim parents are not happy with the choices available to them, particularly the schools with high concentrations of minorities. Even so, a large section of the Muslim population remains quite satisfied with the two hours per week of Islamic instruction provided by the Belgian state. One can also find Islamic instruction provided in some Catholic schools in which there is a heavy concentration of minorities. This has meant that calls for Islamic schools in Belgium have been muted. For the handful of parents who insist on a total Islamic education in which the values and ethos of Islam are incorporated into the entire school culture and curriculum, few options remain. While there have been several unorganized attempts to establish Islamic schools in Belgium, there remains only one Islamic primary school in Brussels, housed within the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC). It is funded by the state, yet owing to its strong Saudi links, the orientation of the school is a rather orthodox one. Its student body aa m [c ]r Islamic schools in three western countries 415 consists of two hundred primary school students, more or less, the majority of whom are in the kindergarten level (Renaerts, 1999). A significant number of its students are children of foreign diplomats. This school opened in 1989 amidst a storm of controversy; indeed, its creation led to an incendiary debate over the Belgian constitutional guarantees of freedom of education. Its establishment can most certainly be linked to the refusal of two municipalities in Brussels for failing to make provision for Islamic instruction (Platti, 1990; Nielsen, 1992). These refusals were made on the basis of there being no official representative recognized by the Belgian state to appoint teachers. Though there has been some discussion of establishing other Islamic schools, resistance to more Islamic schools in Belgium has remained strong, notwithstanding the comparably liberal attitudes towards Islam. Initial reactions to an Islamic school on Belgian soil were similar to those of the then Secretary of State of Brussels, who argued that such a school would obstruct the aim of ‘integration’ that the Belgian government was pursuing. Similar scepticism was voiced by the Royal Commissioner of Immigration Policy, who insisted that the only acceptable Islam in Belgium was an ‘integrated’ Islam. Members of several political parties openly denounced it. One politician, when asked about the difference from Jewish or Christian schools, announced that neither of them ‘question the fundamental rights and liberties of the Belgian society’. There really was no convincing argument produced to suggest the illicit nature of founding an Islamic school (they are allowed in article 17 of the Belgian Constitution); rather, reactions had everything to do with the desirability of such a school (Dwyer & Meyer, 1996; Leman & Renaerts, 1996). In Belgium, despite an increase in calls for more Islamic schools—mainly from the Arab European League, an Antwerp-based organization committed to empowering European Muslims—there is little being done about it and public debate has been kept to a minimum. This is so for at least three reasons: (1) Islamic instruction, as previously stated, is widely provided in state schools; (2) most Muslim parents lack the motivation and savvy to organize new schools; and (3) there is strong public opposition to the idea, especially from the Vlaams Blok, which for the past fifteen years has enjoyed as much as one-third of the vote in the province of Antwerp and in the last elections became the largest party in Flanders. The Netherlands Muslims in the Netherlands While the Netherlands shares a strikingly similar immigration history to Belgium, its numbers of Turks and Moroccans are almost exactly reversed. Estimates today put the number of Muslims at more than one million in the Netherlands, or roughly 6% of the total population. Despite a centuries old liberal tolerance for which the Netherlands is renowned, many incidents of xenophobia and hatred have taken place against Islamic institutions, including Islamic schools. Public opinion appears to demand a crackdown on a longstanding liberal immigration policy and opposition to 416 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen the presence of so many immigrants and asylum seekers has grown so much that the Dutch government admitted only 0.6% of the asylum-seekers seeking refuge in the Netherlands in 2001, the lowest percentage in all of Europe (van Stokrom, 2003). Nevertheless, for those already in the Netherlands, the complete revision of the Dutch Constitution in 1983 ensures equal protection (article 1) under the law regardless of one’s religious or non-religious affiliation. This article provides the cornerstone on which minorities in the Netherlands are able to appeal for equal representation and treatment. In 2001, the Netherlands witnessed the unprecedented electoral success of Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn, who sought to have the first article to the Dutch Constitution thrown out, was assassinated only days prior to the May 2002 elections. While his party (LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn) did not enjoy the same magnitude of success as the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, it was also demonstrably anti-immigrant, stressing the incompatibility of Islamic culture with western liberalism. This ‘incompatibility of cultures’ rhetoric has been dubbed the ‘new racism’ (Modood & Werbner, 1997). ‘Islam is a deteriorated culture,’ Fortuyn announced in De Volkskrant following a report that an imam had compared pigs to gays and found pigs more favourable (Meuleman, 2001). Fortuyn, an ostentatiously gay male, nevertheless managed to elicit broad support from average Dutch citizens and many immigrants rallied behind him as well. Until recently, cultural preservation has never been as strong a political issue in the Netherlands as it has in Flanders (de Witte & Klandermans, 2000). This is changing. Fortuyn opened the door to candid intolerance, and tensions continue to skyrocket. Recently, comments in a book published by an Amsterdam mosque advocating that homosexuals be thrown from tall buildings headfirst led to several public denunciations. Not only have some decried such hate speech as beyond the limits of freedom of speech, many also continue to point to the climbing crime rates and large numbers of immigrants who are unemployed. Security concerns and ‘integration’ of immigrants are at the top of the list of constituent demands. The Minister of Education intends to require immigrants to organize, fund and take Dutch courses (including passing a daunting exam) prior to entering the Netherlands. Dutch Islamic schools The first initiatives were taken in 1980, but it was not until 1988 that the first Islamic schools were founded. That it took so long was mainly because the Muslims who wished to found a new school often were inexperienced and did not speak the Dutch language well. Moreover, most were not familiar with the complexities of the legislation, the political balance in the city councils and the bureaucratic rules. Equally relevant was the fact that the people who took the initiative generally did not receive a great deal of cooperation from the central or local authorities; sometimes they even felt the authorities had a policy of actively discouraging the founding of Islamic schools (Teunissen, 1990; Rath et al., 1997). As regards the latter, in the cities of Utrecht and Rotterdam, for instance, the process and success of founding an Islamic Islamic schools in three western countries 417 school varied considerably. According to Rath et al. (1996), the reason for this was that in Utrecht Muslims were judged from a religious perspective, while in Rotterdam they were judged with regard to their social and socio-economic characteristics. The result was that the Muslims in Rotterdam met with far fewer obstacles than those in Utrecht (Driessen & Merry, forthcoming). Still, the pioneer work of the first schools and the establishment of the Islamic School Board Organization (ISBO) paved the way for the founding of later schools. In 2003, there were 41 Islamic primary, 2 Islamic secondary schools and 2 Islamic universities; each of them is supported by sections of the three major Muslim communities: Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese (Dwyer & Meyer, 1995). It should be noted that these still are only small numbers; there are more than 7000 primary and almost 700 secondary schools in the Netherlands. The total primary school population amounts to 1,550,000 students of whom 100,000 or almost 7% are of Turkish or Moroccan descent. Some 8400 students attend the Islamic primary schools, of which 94.5% are disadvantaged; 40% of these students are Moroccan, 37% are Turkish, and the rest constitutes a heterogeneous population of mainly asylum-seekers. Most schools attract students from one specific ethnic group, either Moroccan or Turkish. Islamic schools face many obstacles in maintaining an idealistic Islamic atmosphere conducive to promoting Islamic values and norms. Besides a severe shortage of qualified Muslim instructors, Walford (2002) elaborates other reasons why Islamic schools are not able—for the time being—to foster an exclusively Islamic culture within the schools: (1) while Islamic schools are well-funded—owing to their high ethnic minority/lowincome status student concentration these schools are typically given 1.9 times the base figure per student compared to other schools; see below—insufficient funds exist for developing Muslim-oriented materials, or, for that matter, to translate existing materials into Dutch; (2) the challenges facing new Islamic schools are so great that resources are spread thinly and energies are invested in other time-consuming projects; (3) the very existence of Islamic schools is seen as a remarkable improvement over the previous situation that many are content to make minor adjustments and modifications to the existing curriculum. For some Islamic schools, this results in a school atmosphere that is little different from other Dutch schools, denominational or not. This certainly applies to the non-Islamic schools that are attended mainly by Turkish and Moroccan students. Many studies have shown (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1991, 1995, 1996) that Islamic schools in the Netherlands are far from homogeneous, though commonly schools are organized along ethnic and ideological lines. A relatively high number of the schools is considered ‘liberal’ inasmuch as they reflect similar orientations to Dutch society as non-Muslim schools. Other schools could be categorized as ‘conservative’ owing to the contents of religious instruction and the observation of the Islamic rules of behaviour by staff and students. The main difference from the ‘liberal’ schools has to do with the orientation to the Islamic world and not to Dutch society. 418 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen What is important to point out, however, is that most Islamic schools—regardless of a more ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ orientation—are quite disposed to make minor adaptations to the existing Dutch curriculum in order to ‘Islamicize’ the learning materials. The United States Muslims in the United States It has always been difficult to guess the number of Muslims living in the United States. Estimates vary widely from two to seven million (Broadway, 2001), but three to four million is probably accurate.1 While there are more Muslims in California than any other state, the heaviest concentrations of Muslims are in New Jersey and New York, followed by Florida and Texas. In the Midwest, Illinois, Michigan and Ohio have the strongest representation (Haniff, 2003). Recent studies2 indicate that 25% of American Muslims who regularly attend a mosque are of Arab descent, 33% is south Asian, while 30% is African-American. More than a third of American Muslims are converts (D’Agostino, 2003; Cesari, 2004), 64% of whom are African-Americans, 27% white, many with a Jewish background (CAIR Mosque Study, 2001; Hartford Institute for Religious Research, 2002). The number of mosques in the United States increased by 42% between 1990–2000, and while most studies continue to quote the findings of the 2001 CAIR study which concluded there to be some 1200 mosques, other estimates place the number of mosques at more than 2000. Prior to 9/11, American hostility toward Muslims—while tame compared to Europe—has typically resulted from overseas attacks on Americans by Muslims, such as the 1979–80 Iranian hostage crisis or the 1982 bombing of US Marines in Beirut. The Rushdie Affair, the Gulf Wars, the continued spate of sensationalist anti-Islamic literature in recent years, and most especially the stereotypes of a bloodthirsty Islam in film and popular media fuel a vague anti-Islamic undercurrent in American society. There can be no question that ethnic and religious profiling since 9/11 has targeted ordinary Muslims and Islamic organizations in ways previously unimagined. Nevertheless, the fact that English, and not Arabic or Urdu, continues to be the primary language used in American mosques (Dirks, 2004), coupled with the fact that several Islamic organizations (e.g., Muslim Public Affairs Council, Council for American Islamic Relations) are able to bring considerable pressure to bear on government and the courts, means not only that the majority of American Muslims feel quite assimilated into their respective communities but also that Islam has a viable political voice. American Islamic schools The earliest Islamic schools in the United States were being established in the late 1970s, though the numbers grew significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. During that same time, two Islamic colleges were also founded in Chicago, and plans for an Islamic seminary are underway on the east coast. The reasons for the dramatic growth Islamic schools in three western countries 419 in American Islamic schools mainly has to do with some parents’ desires to provide a culturally and religiously coherent learning environment for their children as well as the relatively few legal obstacles community members face in establishing Islamic schools. The formation of the Council of Islamic Schools in North America (CISNA) in 1991 marked the dawn of a new age in organized Islamic schools. Though growing pains were evident for several years and a series of halting attempts were made to coordinate efforts across the country, there were serious obstacles present in the area of representation, leadership and direction (Muhammad, 1998). There is no national agency directing the educational content in schools; most decisions are left to individual states. As private schools, Islamic schools must do little more than acquire a space for learning and the staff adequate to providing rudimentary services. No minimum number of students is required. For now, most Islamic schools continue to borrow heavily from surrounding public and private schools for ideas on the school charter, lesson plans, textbooks and pedagogical concepts. This dependency on ideas and practices of others has created a certain identity crisis for those who work in Islamic schools. Many teachers and administrators are convinced that apart from a distinctive dress code, Arabic language, and Islamic religious instruction, there is little that is different about Islamic schools if compared to nearby religious or even public schools. Because there is no central agency through which Islamic schools operate (Clara Muhammad schools being excepted; see below), it is difficult to keep track of the number of schools. Estimates vary widely but some place the number of Islamic schools at as many as four hundred (Maughan, 2003), most of which are elementary schools only. School governance can be difficult; Islamic school administrators are notoriously overworked and underpaid. The average length of employment for an Islamic school administrator is three years, roughly half of the public school average (Saleh, 2000). Reports of inadequate administrative support, low pay, staff burnout, and school board ineffectiveness are common. Teacher retention remains an ongoing challenge to Islamic schools (Ezzidine & Moes, 2004). Islamic schools manifest some ethnic diversity, but in the main they continue to be organized around ethnically dominant groups. Palestinian and Indo-Pakistani families are two groups that frequently organize Islamic schools. Ethnic minorities can be found in most Islamic schools, including some Caucasian converts, but one ethnic group typically dominates. Islamic schools may not discriminate in the admissions process on racial grounds (according to Title VII of the Civil Rights legislation of 1964), but notwithstanding this limitation, they may discriminate on religious grounds if they choose to. Clara Muhammad schools Headquartered in Fayetteville, Georgia, currently at least 40 Clara Muhammad schools are scattered throughout the United States and Bermuda, usually in larger cities. Each school is individually governed and administered, although its curriculum is centralized. Its students tend to be predominately African-American, though 420 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen anyone regardless of race, class or creed may attend. These schools seek to promote self-pride, cleanliness and self-determination, but also academic and moral discipline often not found in inner city schools. They operate under the banner, ‘intelligence without morality is a destructive force’ and have made tremendous efforts to develop their own curriculum, independent of the materials and philosophy of other schools. ¯ One researcher explains, ‘their collective objective is to carry the spirit of Qur’an to enable the human intellect to be revived for the advancement of human society’ (Muhammad, 1998, p. 92). Parental involvement may vary widely from one school to another, and many of the schools host a disproportionate number of troubled children, making the task of discipline and higher achievement formidable. There is also, of course, an argument to be made for cultural coherence in Clara Muhammad schools. To the extent that the Clara Muhammad schools seek to redress the socialeconomic disadvantages of black American children, there is much that can be compared with Islamic schools elsewhere, particularly as it concerns identity formation and the building of self-esteem. African-Americans are conspicuously absent from most of the proceedings of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the majority of non-African-American Muslims either have no knowledge of Clara Muhammad schools, or else very low opinions on the basis of perceived ‘lifestyle’ issues, i.e., unruly behaviour, teenage pregnancies, and drug use. This may be the case because a number of Clara Muhammad schools service an unusually high concentration of disadvantaged children, many of whom are not even Muslim, but whose parents are looking for more discipline, character development, and better educational opportunities. Challenges facing Clara Muhammad schools include the effort to be more ‘Islamic,’ and generating sufficient resources to maintain high quality instruction (Hakim & Muhammad, 1992). aa m [c ]r Funding, choice and control Belgium and the Netherlands In the Netherlands, state interference in religious schools, resulting from complete funding, is quite high. According to Eurydice (2004, p. 41), ‘The relationship between educational institutions and the government is characterized by a large measure of institutional autonomy; government merely creates the right conditions’. Still, compared to the American situation one can accurately speak of higher levels of interference. Belgium’s situation is remarkably similar, except that not all types of schools are funded exactly the same. The language divide in Belgium means that the German-, French- and Dutch-speaking communities handle matters as they pertain to education. Education is simply not discussed on a national level, but is left to the regional governments. State control in both countries means that the range of subjects and number of hours of instruction in each is carefully specified. There must also be attention given to multiculturalism, meaning that no one perspective can eclipse others represented in Dutch or Belgian culture. Also required is attention to several world religions. All Islamic schools in three western countries 421 students in both countries are required to take courses in religion and/or ethics, though only in Belgium is non-Christian instruction widely available. Religious or ideological instruction can occur in any school, but the number of hours is tightly regulated. In the Netherlands, each school must produce a ‘school plan’, which has to be submitted to the Education Inspectorate for approval. Although there have been some recent changes towards greater local management of schools, the normal practice is for the government to set and pay directly for all teachers, buildings and school costs. The number of teachers for each school, their salaries, and conditions of work are determined by the government. A very important feature designed to ensure equity is that private schools are not allowed to charge any ‘top up’ fees, and may only charge for extra-curricular activities including visits (Walford, 2001). Schools in both countries are required to appoint only qualified staff, but they may use religion and lifestyle as criteria in their selection. As it concerns choice, both Belgium and the Netherlands allow complete freedom of education for state schools, though in Belgium schools are further divided according to communal (Flemish, German and French), regional (Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders), and municipal levels. The linguistic divide in Belgium also complicates the choice available to Muslim minorities, particularly for Moroccans, but this is slowly changing. Denominational schools in the Netherlands continue to show preference for children from the same religious background, while in Belgium this is no longer legal, but continues surreptitiously, i.e., by requiring a certificate of baptism, or by insisting on expensive school uniforms that poorer families are unable to afford. Furthermore, new laws require that state schools in Belgium no longer show preference on the basis of language, nor may state schools in the Netherlands give preference to native Dutch children. Provided there is room, no one who applies can be turned away. As in the United States, not all schools in Belgium and the Netherlands have the same reputation. Important differences emerge. In the Netherlands, school tests results and quality indicators are made public and can be cross-referenced; in Belgium, while very strict requirements are imposed on the material that teachers must cover, every school has its own tests and reliable comparisons are difficult to come by. Both countries have attempted to provide intercultural education and instruction in the mother tongue though efforts in both countries have largely failed (Hermans, 2002; Driessen, 2004). As it concerns school funding, both countries allocate more money for schools with high concentrations of poor students. In Belgium, different initiatives correspond to the different regional governments. Wallonian policies have attempted to put more money in schools with higher minority concentrations, while Flemish policies have tried to ‘de-concentrate’ schools, thereby expanding the responsibility to be shouldered by more schools (Merry, 2005). The Netherlands has a very systematic approach: ‘average’ Dutch children count for 1 point, working-class Dutch children count for 1.25, while ethnic minority children count for 1.9. This means that schools with high concentrations of ethnic minorities can expect to receive nearly twice as much funding for staff, school materials and programmes3. Despite these efforts, the position of Muslims in the Netherlands and Belgium on the whole has not 422 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen improved; indeed, one can locate reasons to believe that more local control, increased parental choice and the publishing of school achievement levels have not substantially contributed to greater academic success (Mulder & van der Werf, 1997; Driessen & Valkenberg, 2000). A closer look at the Dutch case Full government funding is available to Islamic schools in the Netherlands once certain minimal requirements are met. Statutory requirements, having become much stricter since 1993, now stipulate that there must be at least a 200-student minimum, the language of instruction has to be Dutch, the teachers have to be qualified, and the curriculum has to comply with the stipulations laid down in the Primary Education Act. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated that no other school already in existence within a two-kilometre radius is able to replicate the aims of the school. Most difficult, school sponsors have to demonstrate that the number of students can be maintained for a full fifteen years beyond the first five years. It is the municipality that grants permission for the schools to be established. If the proposals for a new school accent the wrong thing(s), the process can take years to complete. Because these regulations have tightened in order to curtail the number of new schools being established, it has meant that many schools, even across denominational boundaries, have had to merge in order to remain open. The number of new schools established since 1990 has fallen dramatically (Walford, 2001). This legislation is fairly specific and explicit, making it hard for the local authorities to prevent the founding of Islamic schools, though the process of founding such a school is nonetheless arduous and faces many challenges. Yet while there continues to be a steady rise in the number of Islamic schools (10 schools are currently being added to the 41 mentioned above), the current number does not even begin to meet the demand for more schools. According to a study by van Kessel (2000), in the city of Amsterdam, where approximately 50% of the primary school children were of foreign origin and 6 Islamic schools already existed, there was a need for an additional 20 schools. In 2004, van Kessel (2004) concluded from a series of studies on school choice that 30–40% of the Turkish and Moroccan parents would send their children to an Islamic school if there were such a school in the neighbourhood. Based on this preference he estimated that in the Netherlands as a whole there is, in addition to the 41 existing Islamic primary schools, a need for another 120 such schools (Phalet & van Praag, 2004; Driessen & Merry, forthcoming). With more demand for Islamic schools, there is typically a commensurate hesitancy, to put it mildly, on the part of local governing councils to cooperate with the initiatives (Mureau, 2004). Several recent investigations by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education (Inspectie van het Onderwijs, 1999, 2002, 2003) have concluded that almost all of the Islamic schools have an open attitude towards Dutch society and play a positive role in creating conditions for social cohesion. Furthermore, the schools’ instructional approach is culturally sensitive, Dutch language instruction is prominently featured, contacts with other Islamic schools in three western countries 423 schools and local educational and welfare institutions are apparent, and parental participation remains an important goal. Only in a handful of schools was the religious content questionable, but the reports have emphatically stated that Islamic schools are no cause for alarm. Other studies have demonstrated similar findings (Driessen, 1997; Driessen & Bezemer, 1999; Driessen & Valkenberg, 2000; Walford, 2002). In 1998, the Internal Security Service (ISS; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1998) published a report on political Islam in the Netherlands. One of the domains the ISS studied was the education at Islamic schools. Specifically, it had concerns with the interference of foreign powers (e.g., Saudi-Arabia) and political-Islamic organizations with the contents of education. The results of the ISS’ study showed that its suspicion was not completely unfounded. Some schools received substantial donations from the Al-Waqf al-Islami organization, which propagates a very orthodox politic-religious worldview and is intolerant towards liberal Muslims, Jews and Christians. The ISS concluded that the number of radical Muslims in the Netherlands was very small, and that there is no need to fear a growing power and influence in the short run. For the longer term, however, the ISS expects these organizations to gain power as a consequence of the socio-economic malaise, marginalization and exclusion of Muslim immigrants. The results, it hypothesized, might be polarization and disruption of the process of integration. Each of the Dutch political parties knows that to deny rights to one group of schools, or even some of the schools, is to espouse an untenable and potentially embarrassing position. More likely is an attenuated route to ‘integration’ via measures to require Dutch language proficiency for immigrants prior to arriving in the Netherlands and citizenship education requirements. For now, however, the public opinion is strongly against Islamic schools. The reasons typically are that they are socially divisive, nationalistic, or encourage intolerance and separatism from ‘liberal’ Dutch values. The challenge remains, nonetheless, for Dutch policymakers, viz., whether Muslims living in the Netherlands will be attracted to tolerant, liberal values when Muslims’ own freedoms to assemble are increasingly under intense scrutiny. Yet each of these challenges, as of April 2004, constitutes the least of Muslim problems in the Netherlands. In the spring of 2004, Minister of Education van der Hoeven determined that any new Islamic school must have a school board comprised entirely of members with Dutch nationality. Furthermore, they must now explain to the Ministry of Education how they plan to adhere to Dutch norms and values, and no more than 80% of the student body can be from a disadvantaged background. This new ruling—buttressed by public opinion following the murder of Theo van Gogh in November, 2004—undoubtedly portends negative consequences for the founding of new Islamic schools. Dutch Islamic schools, while at one time very promising in the Netherlands, now face insurmountable challenges from the Ministry of Education. How Islamic schools will even manage to find 20% students who are not from disadvantaged backgrounds remains unclear. The new ruling under Minister van der Hoeven would most certainly lead to an abrupt halt in the founding of new Islamic schools. 424 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen The United States American Islamic schools, old and new, face daunting financial and logistical challenges. There may be money available through the mosque, provided the school is mosque affiliated. Yet this mosque affiliation causes innumerable problems as it concerns control, pedagogy and masjid politics. Very few Islamic schools, including those that are well established, are able to provide a school nurse, proper science lab facilities, social workers, music or fine arts classes, special education services, or guidance counsellors. Most also do not have a library or extracurricular activities. Institutional developments are slow, schools are understaffed, and corresponding standards in many schools are poor. Many are still struggling to procure accreditation and state recognition, largely because they are unable to meet state requirements. Increasingly one hears calls for a national Islamic educational trust fund. Private schools (including religious schools) in the United States receive no direct funding, either from the individual states or the federal government. Provided that monies are given to school boards and not to schools directly, schools may be granted real estate, income and sales tax-exemption and many private schools benefit from textbook and transportation subsidies. Only a few cities currently experiment with voucher programmes, which allow those who qualify to attend other schools that participate in the programme, including in some cases private religious schools. It is unclear how many Muslims are availing themselves of these different initiatives, though in Milwaukee, Wisconsin approximately 70% of the student body in both Islamic schools (one is largely Arab-American while the other is a Clara Muhammad school) are voucher recipients. Many religious (including Islamic) schools make financial assistance available to families who have difficulty paying the fees, but it is the exception rather than the rule that a school can provide full scholarships, except in the more elite private schools. The majority of American private schools have a religious affiliation, though a significant number of elite academies also exist which have no denominational basis. Religious schools are far more likely to have smaller budgets; this translates as lower teacher salaries and fewer resources for school facilities and teaching materials. The same applies to Islamic schools. Despite noble aims and very committed staff, tight budgets also mean that many Islamic schools are far from where they need to be to live up to the claims of excellence they promise. Basic school facilities are a top priority for Islamic schools seeking accreditation. If a school has no sinks, eyewash or acid cabinets for the science classes, this prevents the school from having the status it covets and creates an additional strain on the staff, who must forego pay raises so that the school building may be upgraded. The question of mosque affiliation also continues to be a difficult one for schools. Independence from the mosque provides more freedom to organize the school according to the aims of the school board, but independence also brings with it formidable challenges for school budgets. School fees for a typical student at a well-staffed Islamic school can run to several thousand dollars a year; this does not include uniforms or textbooks. Parents also have to decide whether they want their children Islamic schools in three western countries 425 involved in extracurricular activities that the school may not provide. As is the case for public schools, American Islamic schools are only as good as their staff, facilities and parents make them. Many teachers lament how the fiscal limitations of their school curb the range of educational experiences their students are able to have, though positive home reinforcement continues to be the number one reason why students succeed (Lareau, 2000, 2002, 2003). Since 1997, the Council of Islamic Schools in North America (CISNA) has ardently pushed the accreditation issue for Islamic schools and it continues to be a prominent theme at regional and national education conferences. Schools seek out accreditation for a variety of reasons. Mainly accreditation gives a school its seal of validation or approval; it tells the parents and other schools that an accredited school meets certain recognized standards. Being accredited does not guarantee quality, however. Private, nongovernmental agencies normally govern this domain, and quality controls vary widely. Therefore, a rather rigorous process must unfold with a reputable accrediting agency if schools are to meet the requirements necessary for approval, including recognition by the state. Several religious denominations have their own accrediting agencies, most of which are respected by the respective states, and state recognition is important in order to qualify for state funded programmes, scholarship commissions, foundations, and the military, to name a few. If an Islamic school recruits an accrediting agency that shares an inspection team with members of the state board, it typically finds that quality levels remain high. If shortcuts are taken in order to receive the ‘accredited’ label, quality may be severely compromised. Before accreditation can occur, however, there must first be appropriate health, safety, zoning, occupancy, fire and physical structure permits. If a school must provide, say, a nurse or physical education activities in order to receive state accreditation, staff typically do everything within their means to follow through. An accrediting agency will usually be patient, moreover, with a school that has two or three non-certified teachers if they play a critical role in non-certifiable areas (e.g., religion). The main items to determine, once these basic requirements are accomplished, concern the role that parents will play in the internal affairs of the school (Zarzour & Siddiqui, 2004). For the time being, Islamic schools are well advised to use the existing accrediting agencies rather than look to an Islamic educational agency such as the CISNA, which cannot currently enable schools to implement a set of standards. States may not regulate the content of religious instruction, but other religious accrediting agencies give a great deal of freedom for the religious character of schools to flourish (Zarzour, 2003), which makes the need for a specific Islamic accrediting agency redundant. Furthermore, while the IQRA International Educational Foundation and the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) are making impressive efforts to supplement existing curricula, no comprehensive set of curricular materials for Islamic schools presently exists. Most new schools look to neighbouring religious schools (e.g., Jewish, Lutheran, Catholic) for school handbook and teacher contract templates, as well as curricular plans. From there, appropriate adjustments and modifications are made. Each state may have its own laws concerning not-for-profit 426 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen organizations and schools. Nevertheless, states reserve the right to regulate health and safety of all schools, and may ensure that religious schools are providing a service they claim to. Islamic school organizers know that it is first necessary to know the state requirements and then act, openly and transparently, on them. This helps to avoid religious stereotyping and keep media distortion to a minimum (several American newspapers have falsely alleged that Islamic schools teach hate); also, active participation in the local community through a variety of committees (e.g., city council, school and zoning boards) can facilitate the procedures and inspections. Such participation also aids in developing a healthy relationship with committee members who may find the school deficient in standards required for accreditation but are inclined to offer suggestions for ways to improve. Conclusions For the small but growing number of Muslims who seek out an Islamic education for their children, public schools represent moral permissiveness and lower academic achievement. Others are dismayed with the extent to which schools ignore the cultural and religious identities of Muslim children. Notwithstanding the fact that many urban schools offer Muslim children fewer opportunities than suburban ones, the majority of Muslims living in western countries continue to be mostly satisfied with the public education available to their children (Parker-Jenkins, 2002). Yet with a growing unease in western societies towards militant Islam, and as materialism takes a foothold in the second generation, Muslims are increasingly eager to cultivate positive Islamic identities consistent with western citizenship, even at a time when citizenship for many Muslims in Europe is being denied and ethnic profiling continues in the United States. In all three countries studied, some Muslims feel that Islamic schools are a healthy alternative to public schools, though in Belgium, where Islamic instruction in the state (and some denominational) schools is made widely available, the call for Islamic schools is less urgent. Despite there being a constitutional right to denominational equality, talk of Islamic schools being set up in cities other than Brussels thus far has been met with either disinterest or disapproval. This, however, may change as resistance to discrimination against Muslims becomes more organized and outspoken. One such group that is increasingly vocal in Belgian politics is the Arab European League, and establishing more Islamic schools is part of their political agenda. In the Netherlands, while full funding of Islamic schools is an attractive feature, the accountability controls and lack of Muslim staff make the aims of Muslim educators extremely difficult to implement. Despite constitutional guarantees and the successful efforts of school organizers, there remain many hurdles to jump to organize an Islamic school and new legislation will make it even more difficult. There is even reason to believe that greater state maintenance and control of religious schools has the effect of fostering a less religiously based school culture. The minimal amount of federal or state control of religious schools in the United States does not mean that Islamic schools are doing whatever they want. Anxious to Islamic schools in three western countries 427 have credibility in the eyes of the surrounding culture and give their children the best education they can afford—consistent, of course, with an Islamic educational model—the overwhelming majority of Islamic schools eagerly solicit outside ‘interference’ from other schools and local government in order to bring the school up to par. Academic excellence is foremost in organizers’ minds; so is success. Most schools are therefore accredited by the states in which they are established and, allowing for a greatly reduced school budget, schools usually emulate other reputable school models such as state standardized tests, learning targets, and nationally recognized textbooks. Some educators are even encouraging a charter school model in order to receive government subsidies. But one thing is abundantly clear: rather than shun accountability, American Islamic schools enthusiastically embrace it. Concerning choice of education in each of the three countries examined, the freedom to establish Islamic schools in Belgium and the Netherlands exists principally because of their respective national constitutions, but in neither country have Muslims found it easy to establish Islamic schools. No private Islamic schools exist in either country nor are they likely to. Constitutional guarantees in the Netherlands in particular have made it possible for Muslims to demand equal funding for Islamic schools, while for the time being Belgium has circumvented the issue by offering wide-scale Islamic instruction in state schools. Notwithstanding its constitutional guarantees, the Netherlands makes no consistent provisions for Islamic schools, and thus has been forced—on the strength of its own legislation—to support Islamic schools as long as minimal requirements are met. It would be untrue to say that Muslims are being singled out on the issue of separate schools. Sikhs, Hindus and evangelical Protestants in the Netherlands have also waged legal battles to win the right to establish separate schools, some of them lasting years (Walford, 2001, 2002). Still, Muslims are commonly seen as a threatening political presence in a way that the other groups generally are not. Equality on paper, therefore, has not translated into equality in practice. Notwithstanding the positive reports issued by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education, Islamic schools continue to be viewed with distrust, and elections make Islamic schools easy targets for vilification as unemployment and crime push popular opinion against the presence of a visible minority group. In the wake of the van Gogh murder, some mosques and Islamic schools became targets either for vandalism or arson. In the United States, despite the fact that the number of Islamic schools continues to climb, owing to the lack of direct state subsidies to private schools it is perhaps true to say that private religious schools are equally disadvantaged. Still, with a much wealthier and better-educated Muslim populace, many American Muslims are better able to pay the steep fees that Islamic schools require to operate. These fees can be reduced once tax exemption status is procured and if/when schools establish links to a mosque to help shoulder the financial burden. Given the higher socio-economic status of Muslims in the United States, Muslims are better positioned to see the number of Islamic schools rise. Some Muslims are calling for Islamic charter schools or an expansion of voucher programmes while others caution against such initiatives knowing that state controls may interfere with the school mission. Most schools 428 M. S. Merry and G. Driessen operate according to curricular plans comparable or identical to surrounding public or more established denominational schools. However, it is also likely that better governance of school curriculum from an Islamic accrediting agency will emerge in the next ten years. Concerns over the quality of education for children in Islamic schools vary from school to school and cannot be indiscriminately applied. In most cases, there is a period of ‘growing pains’ at new schools in all three countries. Because of the heavy concentration of disadvantaged children in Dutch Islamic schools, no promising trends presently exist pointing to better academic outcomes for Islamic school students. This is so despite generous funding for schools with large disadvantaged populations. There is no comparable evidence in either Belgium or the United States. In Belgium this is the case because only one Islamic school exists and it receives full state funding (many of its parents are also foreign diplomats), while in the United States Islamic schools are established by communities determined to do so, often with the generous aid of donations and voluntarism of the Muslim community. Where some critics of Islamic schools continue to have lingering anxiety, however, concerns the ability of Islamic schools to prepare children to live in a multicultural society and to reflect critically upon their inherited beliefs and cultural norms. Notes 1. The 2001 CAIR study concluded that there are approximately 5–6 million, while that same year the American Jewish Committee estimated there to be 1.9 million. The State University of New York (SUNY) conducted another study, also in 2001, in which they concluded there to be between 1.1 and 2.2 million. See Broadway (2001). The reasons for this uncertainty have to do with the fact that both the US Census Bureau and US Immigration Service are forbidden to ask questions concerning one’s religion. Moreover, most mosques do not have formal membership policies and it is rare to find accurate attendance records. Using ethnicity as an indicator of religious affiliation is unreliable for a variety of reasons not least because a large number of Arab-Americans are Christian. The breakdown in ethnicity varies somewhat from study to study and, particularly since 9/11/ 2001, is sometimes guided by ideology. Another finding, with data supplied by the American Muslim Council and gathered between 1986–1992, reports South Asians at 24.4%, AfricanAmericans at 42%, Arabs at 12.4%, Turks at 2.4%, Iranians at 3.6%. See www.ugs.edu/islam/ muslimpop_usa.html. Jocelyne Cesari is correct to say that a systematic comparison of different [Muslim] ethnic groups in the United States ‘remains to be written’ (Cesari, 2004, p. 4). The Dutch Educational Priority Policy (Onderwijsvoorrangsbeleid or OVB) had as one of its primary purposes to supply schools with more staff, special teaching methods, and opportunities for more contact with parents of ethnic minority pupils. However, one longitudinal study in the 1990s demonstrated that the OVB had had very little impact on the achievement levels of disadvantaged pupils. Three reasons are likely for this. First, outside of priority or target areas, school staff were largely unaware of the extra resources. Second, no conditions were set for how schools would use extra staff or resources; the only criterion was that the schools submit a plan ‘describing problems, aims, activities, organizational structure and budget allocations’. Third, while some improvements (e.g., class size reduction) were observable, these were not limited to the targeted groups but extended to all groups, thus maintaining the general achievement gap. (Mulder & van der Werf, 1997). Some evidence suggests that the situation for disadvantaged autochthonous Dutch children, most of whom live in the rural northern provinces and 2. 3. Islamic schools in three western countries 429 count as 1.25, has deteriorated even more than it has for the allochthonous pupils. See Tesser, (2003), pp. 53–78. The Educational Disadvantage Policy (Onderwijsachterstandbeleid), which took over where the Educational Priority Policy left off, effectively gives more autonomy to the municipalities and local school boards. This portends more difficulties in assessing both the appropriation of funding and the achievement of disadvantaged students. Notes on contributors Michael S. Merry recently completed his doctorate at the University of WisconsinMadison. His dissertation is a philosophical-comparative study of Islamic schools in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States. He has published several articles dealing with Islam and Muslim populations in the west. 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